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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Number 65-62

The Katanga Integration Problem

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
16 MAY 1962

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The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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THE KATANGA INTEGRATION PROBLEM¹

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for early agreement on reintegration of Katanga into the Congo and the likely consequences of the failure of current efforts to secure such agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Katanga separatism is regarded by the Central Government, other Africans, and the neutrals as a successful effort by Western commercial interests to retain a "neocolonial" position in Katanga and thus to prevent the full independence of the Congo. Adoula is under considerable pressure to show progress toward the integration of Katanga under the Central Government. Adoula wants a wide measure of authority over Katanga. However, his minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.² (*Paras. 5, 9, 20*)

2. Although Tshombe recognizes the many outside forces opposed to his maintaining Katanga as a near-independent state, he is under no significant pressure from within Ka-

¹ SNIE 65-2-61, "Possible Developments in Katanga," dated 7 December 1961, remains essentially valid.

² The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would prefer that this sentence read as follows:

In order to preserve his own political position in Leopoldville, he must have, as an absolute minimum, recognition by Tshombe of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.

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tanga to reach any accommodation with Adoula. On the contrary, the tribal elements of southern Katanga, and Belgian and British commercial interests and residents in Katanga, as well as the Europeans in neighboring countries (Northern Rhodesia in particular), support his present position. In any agreement with Adoula, Tshombe's minimum requirements would include a considerable degree of provincial autonomy plus a guaranteed share of Katanga revenues. (Paras. 15, 20)

3. Negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe are unlikely to achieve any early accommodation unless both sides are subjected to stepped up pressures and inducements by outside forces, particularly by the Belgian and UK Governments and economic interests, the UN, and the US. We do not believe that their minimum needs are so inconsistent as to make agreement impossible. If some movement on the issue is not evident in a relatively short time, Adoula or a successor may take more radical and intransigent initiatives, including acceptance of military aid from Afro-Asian or Bloc states. It cannot be excluded that the Central Government will attempt to subdue Katanga by force. (Paras. 20-21, 25)

4. We do not believe that any attempt to subdue Katanga militarily, by either UN or Congolese Army forces, would be promising. Such action would be likely to bring about conditions of such disorder that the prospects for unity and an orderly political and economic development of the Congo would be further reduced. (Para. 23)

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DISCUSSION

Introduction

5. Katanga's separation from the rest of the Congo has symbolized to Africans and to many others the power of Western commercial interests and "neocolonialists" to block the realization of unity and full national independence. Behind the pressure for unification are: the desire of leaders of the Central Government to establish Leopoldville's authority over Katanga, the desire of all parts of the Congo to share the revenues of the mining enterprises of Katanga, and the importance to the Afro-Asian world of the principle of national unity.

6. However, there are also strong centrifugal forces. The Central Government does not exercise effective control over all the territories now under its nominal authority. Even among Central Government politicians there are many who favor a high degree of local autonomy. Moise Tshombe has the support of the tribal elements in southern Katanga in his effort to maintain the autonomy of the province. Even if Tshombe were to submit to Leopoldville, the Central Government would still be faced with a long and difficult task of unifying the country. If a serious effort were made to impose national unity, the demands of other parts of the Congo for local autonomy would become more vocal.

The Current Negotiations

7. Premier Adoula of the Congo Central Government and President Tshombe of Katanga have been negotiating off and on in Leopoldville since 18 March 1962. Adoula has continued to insist that Katanga accept the *Loi Fondamentale* as evidence of its subordination to the Central Government, although he

has acknowledged that the *Loi* needs to be modified to provide increased provincial autonomy. Tshombe has shown some willingness to make concessions on minor functional details of the Katanga-Central Government relationship, but has refused to give up any meaningful authority he now has in Katanga pending adoption of a new constitution.

8. There is little chance that either of the two principals will offer concessions sufficient to gain agreement unless pressures and inducements are stepped up considerably. Meanwhile Adoula is telling representatives of the US Government that political pressures on him are building up to the point where he must seek other means than the current negotiations and reliance on the UN, or risk overthrow. He has talked several times of asking the UN to withdraw and of seeking the aid of sympathetic Afro-Asian and Bloc states. More recently he has told US representatives that he will not go to the Communists for help and that his approaches to Afro-Asian states are for help within the context of their role as UN members.

9. We cannot estimate with any certainty the future of present negotiations under UN sponsorship. Adoula is unquestionably under strong pressure from his supporters as well as his opponents in Leopoldville to show progress on integration, but he can, if he wishes, continue to negotiate for some time. Tshombe, for his part, has every reason to employ delaying tactics and keep the talks going, although he might be forced to break them off by pressures from Elisabethville. We are inclined to believe, however, that the negotiations will break down only if and when Adoula feels compelled to resort to other means to obtain the reintegration of Katanga.

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Adoula's Situation and Likely Courses of Action

10. Adoula's lack of commitment to any particular tribal, regional, or party group has made him an acceptable head of a government made up of men with a wide range of political viewpoints and representing widely dispersed tribes and territories. However, his lack of a political base of his own may make him increasingly vulnerable as the pressures build up for action against Katanga separatism. Sooner or later Adoula is going to have to show progress in solving the Katanga issue or develop an increasingly tough approach to the problem—or be forced to step aside for someone else to have a try.

11. Adoula's frustrations may have led him to overstate the immediacy of the danger to his position. Less than a third of the active members of the Chamber of Deputies now favor removing him. However, that number will grow as time passes without evidence of progress toward the integration of Katanga. At any time some unforeseen incident could crystallize opposition forces that might lead to Adoula's replacement by a radical and less cooperative leader. It is equally likely that Adoula would himself adopt a more radical course if necessary to preserve his political position.

12. We believe that the chances are better than even that, in the absence of practical evidence of progress toward the integration of Katanga, Adoula will, before many weeks have passed, try new initiatives. He is unlikely to begin with a sudden attack on the UN and the US and the efforts they have been making in behalf of a settlement, but will rather step up his attempts to persuade the US and the UN to bring increased pressures to bear on Tshombe. Before long he would probably go to the UN for help in bringing about the integration of Katanga by force. In the event of failure, he would then turn to the Afro-Asian states, and possibly even to the Bloc for assistance in the buildup of his military forces

in preparation for forceful seizure of Katanga. It cannot be excluded that Adoula might at an earlier stage try to use the army, unreliable and incapable as it may be, to impose unification on Katanga. He might do this in the hope that it would bring UN forces into action on his side. He is probably aware that there are important elements among the UN forces which would welcome a chance to subdue Tshombe.

13. If Adoula goes to the UN for a mandate to end Katanga's secession, by force if necessary, differences among the interested Western states would inevitably be spotlighted. Western opposition to a "unity-by-force" resolution would be exploited by many Afro-Asian states and the Bloc.

14. All along the line Adoula would be looking for a solution to his basic problem, which is essentially political. What he will be searching for is some means of providing convincing evidence that his government is acknowledged by the whole Congo as the Central Government.

Tshombe's Situation and Likely Courses of Action

15. It is Tshombe's purpose to maintain his position in Katanga and to retain for Katanga as much of its present autonomy as possible. He recognizes the various pressures upon him to integrate his province with the rest of the Congo. None of these, however, has persuaded him that he must make more than minor concessions. He recognizes that the UN with its representatives and military forces in the Congo, the US Government, the Afro-Asians in the UN and elsewhere are all against his maintaining Katanga as a near-independent state. On the other hand, Tshombe feels that he has the direct backing of Belgians and other Europeans in Katanga and the support of important influences in Europe and America. Also important is the fact that the Acting UN Secretary General

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has publicly indicated his belief that financial problems will require a significant reduction of the UN presence in the Congo, probably beginning about mid-1962. Although two UN attempts to force Congo integration have been abortive, we believe Tshombe would make considerable effort to avoid a third round of hostilities with its attendant disorder and destruction. We expect Tshombe to continue to play a waiting game, and to make no concessions to the Central Government which he does not feel compelled to make.

Other Parties to the Situation

16. Belgium's interest in the Congo tend to be dominated by its large economic investment, a significant part of which is in the Katanga. It has also been powerfully influenced by the blame and opprobrium which were heaped on it as the "imperialist" power responsible for the chaotic international mess which the Congo became in 1960-1961. The powerful mining interests, while showing some awareness of the need for a Katanga settlement, essentially support Tshombe against both the Central Government and the extremists in his own regime. They tend to discount the problems of the Central Government and the dangers in the situation which might follow the downfall of Adoula. The government in Brussels, however, is increasingly disposed to think of the problem in terms of the future of the Congo as a whole, though it is frequently unable to influence the Union Minière du Haut Katanga or the UMHK's representatives in Katanga. When it is able to carry the UMHK people in Brussels, they are not always able to persuade their representatives on the spot to carry out instructions.

17. The UK is another interested party, not only because of its large financial stake in Katanga, but further by reason of its involvement in the Rhodesias. The latter are now going through an extremely delicate and highly important phase of decolonization

which would almost certainly be adversely affected by another upheaval in the Congo, particularly by another round of fighting in Katanga. The UK Government would probably accept and cooperate with any measures to bring a resolution of present problems in the Congo so long as they did not involve use of force in Katanga.

18. Most of the Afro-Asian states regard Katanga's integration as a moral obligation incumbent on the Western world and the UN. Were integration efforts to fail, many Afro-Asian states would consider the US responsible along with the UK, Belgium, and France. Soviet Bloc states are currently playing no significant role in the Congo, but they will be alert to exploit for their own purposes any change which turns Adoula or the Afro-Asians against the West on the issue of integration.

19. The UN itself is also a party to the situation. There are differences of opinion on UN objectives and courses of action among the various responsible UN officials in New York and in the Congo. UN officials generally are acutely conscious of the extent to which the world organization's future is tied to the success of its operations in the Congo. Most UN officials and commanders of the military units in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) are disposed to use the UN's influence and authority to press for integration and some even favor the use of UNOC troops to force Tshombe to his knees. Past experiences in the use of military force for political objectives in the Congo have, however, made some of them cautious. The Acting Secretary General, U Thant, probably shares the interest of his advisers in integration of the Congo, but he is concerned about financial problems, and dubious of the use of force by the UN. He also probably considers that the UN lacks the means and the mandate to impose integration by force.

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Prospects

20. Despite their inability to reach agreement yet and the lack of promise that they will be able to do so on their own, Adoula's and Tshombe's minimal political requirements are not necessarily irreconcilable. We believe that each is capable of making the concessions which would satisfy the political problems of the other without himself losing his own political position. Adoula's minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.^{*} Tshombe needs a grant of partial autonomy to the government of Katanga—something which all the provinces probably will ultimately demand—and a guarantee of revenues. Each is afraid to offer concessions before the other has come forth with balancing concessions and each distrusts the other's good faith in the implementation of an agreement. The UN can certainly continue to play an important role as mediator, but settlement is unlikely unless further pressures are brought to bear on both parties at the same time.

21. We believe that such pressures, to be effective, would have to be imposed upon both Tshombe and Adoula, and that they would have to be agreed to and jointly exercised primarily by the UN, the US, the UK, and Belgium, including Belgian economic interests in the Congo. We also believe that they would be most effective if developed in support of a master plan to develop and unify the Congo, politically and militarily as well as economically, but which would

^{*}The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would prefer that this sentence read as follows:

In order to preserve his own political position in Leopoldville, he must have, as an absolute minimum, recognition by Tshombe of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.

permit a considerable degree of provincial autonomy.

22. The threat to use UN military force against him might, in certain circumstances, influence Tshombe to enter into agreements integrating Katanga into the Central Government. Tshombe himself, as well as the economic interests in Katanga, would wish to avoid the physical damages inescapable in the case of hostilities.

23. However, the actual use of UN military force to bring concessions from Katanga would raise many difficulties. The UN forces as presently constituted in Katanga probably could not successfully expand operations beyond securing and holding areas presently occupied. In north and central Katanga, they are few in number and do not possess offensive capabilities. In southern Katanga, they would meet strong resistance if they attempted to occupy areas outside Elisabethville, particularly the Katangan military strongholds at Jadotville and Kolwezi. However, if provided with additional logistical support and freedom of military action including air operations, present UN forces probably could secure and hold all the main centers in Katanga. In this last case, however, Katanga forces would be likely to resort to guerrilla-type operations and could severely harass UN forces for some time. In any event, we believe that once hostilities were actually in train between UN forces and Katanga, the prospects for the restoration of a peaceful unified Congo would not be bright.

24. Any extensive use of UN forces against Katanga would be strongly opposed by our Western Allies. In particular, the UK would be apprehensive that any violence in Katanga would upset the political transition now under way in Northern Rhodesia. Hostilities in southern Katanga would almost certainly involve physical damage to the economy and place foreign investment in

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jeopardy and thus be opposed by all having economic interests there.

25. Unless tangible progress is made toward integration of Katanga, the Central Government—under Adoula or a successor—increasingly will be tempted to resort to radical courses of action outside the UN framework. One of these will probably be to send the Congolese Army (ANC) against Tshombe. The ANC, however, is almost certainly incapable of imposing Leopoldville's authority on southern Katanga. External help from

Afro-Asian and Bloc sources could in time—probably a good many months—improve the ANC, but we anticipate that at the same time a buildup of Katangan forces would take place. In any event a military showdown would not resolve the problems of Congo unity but rather would result in disorders reminiscent of the summer of 1960. Likewise, efforts to rebuild public administration in the Congo are likely to be frustrated, as would be attempts to organize and develop the economy of the country as a whole.

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